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Abstract 
  
  
This  Article  advances  a  proposal  that  would  substantially 
increase   access   to   justice   for   valuable   lawsuits   that   are 
currently   deterred   by   litigation   costs.   In   our   proposed 
system,  a  plaintiff  is  allowed  to  select  a  damage  multiplier, 
which  determines  the  amount  of  damages  recoverable if  the 
case is won. Courts  then randomly  select cases for litigation 
with  a  probability  inverse  to  the  multiplier  chosen  by  the 
plaintiff. 
 3 
1. Introduction  
Frivolous  law  suits,  spectacular  punitive  damage  awards,  and  surprising  
jury verdicts all seemingly stand in testament to the notion that the level of  
1  
litigation  in  today's  society  is  excessive.   However,  from  a  societal  point  of  
view   it   can   also   be   argued   that   there   are   an   inadequate   number   of  
lawsuits.  2  If  too  few  lawsuits  are  filed,  too  few  potential  tortfeasors  will  
invest adequately in precaution. Economic theory predicts that a victim will  
file  a  lawsuit  only  if  the  expected  benefits  of  a  trial  outweigh  the  expected  
costs.  Thus,  even  when  a  victim  has  a  highly  meritorious  claim,  i.e.  when  
the probability of winning is high, a potential plaintiff will not file a lawsuit  
if   the   litigation   costs   outweigh   the   expected   benefits   of   trial.   In   such  
circumstances, substantial public, as well as private gains could be attained  
by  increasing  access  to  justice.  By  creating  negative  value  suits,  litigation  
costs  undermine  the  deterrent  effect  of  tort  law.  Surely,  if  tortfeasors  can  
prevent   certain   accidents   at   low   costs,   the   absence   of   a   reasonable  
expectation   of   facing   a   lawsuit   is   problematic   (Dari-Mattiacci   &   Parisi,  
2005).  
 
This Article advances a  proposal that would substantially increase access  
to  justice.  The  proposal  has  two  components.  First,  under  the  proposed  
system   a   plaintiff   is   allowed   to   choose   a   damage    multiplier,   which  
determines  the  amount  of  damages  he  or  she  receives  if  their  case  is  won.3  
Second,  courts  randomly  select  cases  for  trial  with  a  probability  inverse  to  
the  multiplier  selected  by  the  plaintiff.  In  essence,  this  proposal  introduces  
a   flexible   damage   multiplier   which   inversely   affects   the   probability   of  
adjudication.  
 
The advantages of the proposal are threefold. First, by reducing the costs  
of litigation relative to the gains, a multiplier increases access to justice for  
some  individuals  that  would  otherwise  not  pursue  claims  with  substantial  
merit.   Consequently,   the   deterrent   function   of   the   legal   system   will   be  
improved. Second, our proposal will reach these objectives without inducing  
excessive  precautions.  Because  the  random  element  of  adjudication  is  set  
off  against  the  increased  damages  of  the  multiplier,  the  expected  loss  of  a  
1 
 
2 
See, e.g., Galanter, 1983;Barnes, 1993.  
There   may   be   an   inadequate   amount   of   lawsuits   because   plaintiffs   do   not  
adequately take  into  account  the  positive  effects  of  their  lawsuits  on  the  deterrent  
function of the tort system. This problem will be acute when the social benefits of a  
lawsuit outweigh the private gains of the plaintiff (Shavell, 1982).  
3
 The proposal can be applied to civil actions where damages are sought.  
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 suit  remains  more  or  less  equal  for  the  defendant  in  our  proposal. 4  Third,  
the   system   operates  without  any   need  for  information  on   behalf   of   the  
government  regarding  litigants'  trial  costs.  Under  the  proposal,  a  plaintiff  
simply chooses a multiplier in function of his or her own trial costs.  
 
We  proceed  as  follows.  Part  2  describes  the  proposal  and  outlines  the  
main  effects.  Part  3  contains  a  formal  exposition  of  our  proposal.  Part  4  
discusses  a  number  of  possible  objections  to  our  proposal.  Part  5  provides  
some possible modifications to the proposal. Part 6 concludes.  
2 Proposal  
A  simple  numerical  example  demonstrates  the  effect   of   our  proposal.  
Suppose  there  are  three  groups  of  victims  seeking  compensatory  damages  
for  accident  losses.  Victims  in  Group  1  face  trial  costs  of  $50,  victims  in  
Group 2 will incur trial costs of $100, and finally, victims in Group 3 will be  
met   with   $300   in   trial   costs.   The   following   assumptions   apply   to   each  
group: (1) Each victim has suffered a compensable harm of $100, (2) there is  
a  70%  probability  of  obtaining  compensation  at  trial  (assume  further  that  
the  plaintiff  and  defendant  share  this  estimate),  (3)  the  trial  costs  of  the  
defendant  are $50,  and finally  (4)  each party  bears  their  own trial  costs,  as  
is the case under the American rule. Accordingly, victims in Group 1 will be  
willing  to go to court: the expected  value of  trial  is positive (0.7x$100  -  $50  
=   $20).   Victims   in   Group   2   will   not   go   to   trial:   the   expected   value   of  
litigation is negative (0.7x$100 - $100 = -$30). Likewise, victims in Group 3  
will  not  go  to  trial  under  the  current  system  (0.7x$100  -  $300  =  -  $230).  
Although  victims  in  all  three  groups  have  a  rather  meritorious  claim  (70%  
chance of victory), only those in Group 1 have a credible threat of suit. As a  
result, only victims in Group 1 are likely to receive a settlement offer.  
 
Under  our  proposal,  victims  in  all  three  groups  have  a  credible  threat  to  
sue. Our proposal operates as follows: first, a plaintiff is allowed to choose a  
damage  multiplier  which  determines  the  amount   of  damages  he  or  she  
receives   in   the   event   that   the   trial   is   won.   For   example,   if   the   victim  
chooses  a  multiplier  of  3,  he  or  she  will  not  receive  $100,  but  rather  $300.  
 
4
 This stands in contrast to systems of "pure multipliers" (without a random element  
of adjudication). Under a pure multiplier system, there is a risk that the multiplier  
will be set either too low (leading to inadequate precautions) or too high (leading to  
excessive precautions). A multiplier that  brings about first-best deterrence must be  
chosen  by  striking  a  balance  between  the  supply  of  lawsuits  and  the  need  to  
internalize costs. See Hylton & Miceli, 2005.  
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 Second, a victim is only allowed to bring the case to  trial with a  probability  
that  equals  the  (multiplicative)  inverse  of  the  selected  multiplier.  In  our  
example,  the  victim  will  have  a  33.3%  (1/3)  chance  that  the  case  will  be  
allowed  to  proceed.  Thus,  there  is  a  probability  of  66.6%  that  the  case  will  
not  be  selected  for  adjudication.  If  we  return  to  the  example  above,  we  see  
that  the  victims  in  Group  2  will  be  offered  a  positive  settlement  amount  
under our proposal  if they  select a  multiplier  of  3. Note that  the settlement  
amount  approximates  the  expected  judgment  ($70).  The  expected  value  of  
trial    for    a    victim    in    Group    2    thus    increases    from    -$30    to    $36.67  
(1/3x(0.7x$300 - 100)). In this instance, there is a probability of 1/3 that the  
victim  will  be  allowed  to  try  their  case  in  court.  The  victim  has  a  70%  
chance   of   obtaining   $300   (3x100)   while   incurring   trial   costs   of   $100.  
However,   with   a   probability   of   2/3,   the  plaintiff   will  not   be   allowed   to  
pursue  his  claim  before  the  courts.  In  that  event  of  course,  the  plaintiff  is  
left  empty-handed.  Meanwhile,  the  defendant's  expected  losses  under  our  
system  amount  to  $86.67  (1/3x(0.7x$300  +  $50))  when  faced  with  a  victim  
belonging  to  Group  2.  If  the  parties  divide  the  settlement  surplus  equally,  
the  victim  will  receive  a  settlement  of  $61.67.  Clearly,  victims  in  Group  3  
are  not  aided  much  by  a  multiplier  of  3.  The  expected  value  of  the  case  
remains negative (since 0.7x300 - 300 < 0). But if this type of victim selects  
a  multiplier  of  5,  this  suit  too  will  obtain  a  positive  expected  value  (since  
0.7x500   -   300   >   0). 5   It   is   obvious   that   any   plaintiff,   regardless   of   the  
amount of trial costs faced, can select a multiplier that would allow the suit  
to obtain a positive expected value. Note that the government does not need  
to  obtain  any  information  about plaintiffs' trial  costs  to allow  the  system  to  
operate.  
 
The   intuitive   explanation   is   as   follows:   the   expected   benefits   for   the  
plaintiff   remain   the   same   irrespective  of   the   magnitude   of   the  damage  
multiplier  they  choose.  The  combination  of  the  selected  multiplier  and  the  
inverse  probability  of  trial  (being  allowed)  has  a  canceling  effect.  In  the  
example above, if the plaintiff selects a  multiplier of 3, the expected benefit  
equals  $70  (1/3  x  0.7  x  $300).  If  the  plaintiff  selects  a  multiplier  of  5,  the  
expected  benefit  still  remains  $70  (1/5  x  0.7  x  $500).  While  the  expected  
benefits remain the same, the expected costs of litigation decrease when the  
selected  damage  multiplier  is  relatively  higher.  A  high  multiplier  reduces  
the  probability  that  the  case  will  be  allowed  to  proceed  and  that  trial  costs  
will be incurred. In the absence of a damage multiplier, the expected cost of  
litigation  equals  $100  for  a  plaintiff  in  Group  2.  With  a  damage  multiplier  
of 3, litigation costs must be adjusted by the 33.3% probability that the trial  
will  occur,  therefore  reducing  the  (expected)  costs  to  $33.33  (100/3).  If  the  
5
  In  fact,  the  suit  attains  positive  expected  value  (PEV)  as  soon  as  the  multiplier  
exceeds 30/7.  
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 plaintiff had selected a multiplier of 10, the expected costs would further be  
reduced   to   $10   (100/10).   In   summary,   the   combination   of   a   damage  
multiplier  and   an   inversely  related   probability   of  adjudication  does   not  
affect  the  benefits  of  litigation,  yet  it  certainly  decreases  the  costs  thereof.  
Thus, the overall effect is an increase of the expected value of the plaintiff's  
claim.  A  larger  multiplier  leads  to  a  larger  expected  value  of  trial  because  
expected  trial  costs  are  lowered.  This  proposal  thus  enables  a  victim  to  file  
a  legitimate  lawsuit  that  would  have  typically  gone  un-filed  due  to  the  
prohibitive costs relative to the potential gains.  
 
At  first  glance,  one  may  fear  that  this  system  will  be  so  detrimental  to  
potential    tortfeasors    that    they    will    be    induced    to    take    excessive  
precautionary  measures.  Indeed,  injurers  may  ultimately  pay  an  amount  
far greater the value of the actual harm done. However, this argument fails  
to  recognize  that  victims  (are  allowed  to)  litigate  only  with  a  probability  
that  is  inversely  related  to  the  damage  multiplier.  For  example,  even  if  a  
plaintiff  in  Group  3  would select  a  multiplier  of  5,  the  expected  loss  for  the  
defendant  "only"  equals  $80  (1/5  x  (0.7  x  500  +  50)).   If  the  plaintiff  had  a  
PEV  claim  to  begin  with,  then  the  expected  loss  of  the  defendant  would  
have  been  larger:  0.7x100  +  50  =  $120.  Also,  note  that  most  parties  will  
settle prior to the selection of a multiplier.  
 
How  will  the  current  proposal  alter  the  behavior  of  litigants?  First,  by  
selecting  a  multiplier,  a  plaintiff  creates  a  credible  threat  of  initiating  a  
lawsuit.  For  this  reason,  many  defendants  will  be  inclined  to  settle as  soon  
as a  multiplier is selected  by the plaintiff. In fact, the simple availability of  
a  multiplier in general may  be  sufficient  to induce  settlement  offers. A risk  
neutral  plaintiff  will  likely  select  the  lowest  possible  multiplier  that  is  still  
capable   of   sufficiently   creating   a   credible   threat   of   litigation   to   the  
defendant.  The  multiplier,  as  selected  by  the  plaintiff,  will  be  affected  also  
by  potential  optimism  regarding  the  relative  trial  costs  of  the  parties.  As  
the  formal  exposition  in  Part  3  demonstrates,  a  risk  neutral  plaintiff  will  
often  select  the  highest  possible  multiplier.  This  offers  two  benefits  to  the  
plaintiff.  First,  because  the  expected  costs  are  minimized  with  a  maximum  
multiplier, the plaintiff's expected value is maximized  in  the event that  the  
case  goes  to  trial.  Second,  a  high  multiplier  may  maximize  a  defendant's  
settlement  offer  if  the  plaintiff's  trial  costs  exceed  those  of  the  defendant.  
This  is  because  a  high  multiplier  works  in  favor  of  the  party  with  the  
highest  relative  litigation  costs. 6    The  larger  the  multiplier,  the  more  the  
 
6
 Consider the following numerical example where the trial costs of the plaintiff are  
lower  than  those  of  the  defendant.  Assume  a  dispute  where  $100  is  at  stake  and  
both parties believe that there is an 80 percent probability that the plaintiff will win  
the  case  at  trial.  Imagine  further  that  the  plaintiff's  costs  of  litigation  ($90)  are  
lower  than  the  defendant's  ($150).  The  plaintiff's  claim  has  a  negative  expected  
value (0.8x$100-$90=-$10). If (as we assume for the sake of simplicity) the plaintiff  
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Rosenberg   and   Shavell   the   fundamental   idea   of   introducing   a   random  
element  to  adjudication,  8  our  proposal  is  fundamentally  different  in  terms  
of  application  and  implementation.  First,  our  focus  is  not  on  reducing  the  
amount   of   litigation.   Instead,   we   hope   to   increase   access   to   justice   in  
general.   Second,   we   aim   to   improve   the   deterrent   function   of   the   tort  
system by bringing to life so-called negative value suits that have merit but  
are  currently  not  filed  because  of  litigation  costs.  Instead,  the  proposal  by  
Rosenberg   and   Shavell   exclusively   targets   cases   that   would   be   filed  
regardless. 9   Third,   our   proposal   introduces   a   multiplier   selected   by   the  
plaintiff    rather    than    a    system    of    double    damages    with    conditional  
adjudication.  In   our  view,  it  is  sensible  to  allow  plaintiffs  to  select   the  
multiplier     themselves     because     the     government     generally     has     less  
information  on  litigation  expenditures  of  potential  plaintiffs  in  any  given  
dispute.10  
difference   between   parties'   expected   trial   costs   is   reduced.   In   reality,  
plaintiffs  may  seldom  ask  for  large  multipliers  due  to  risk  averseness.  A  
risk  averse  plaintiff,  who  prefers  certain  outcomes  over  uncertain  events  
(even   if   the   expected   benefits   are   identical),   will   be   sensitive   to   the  
probability  of  not  being  selected  for  trial.  For  this  reason,  a  risk  averse  
plaintiff will generally prefer lower multipliers.  
 
Our  proposal  shares  common  ground  with  a  recent  article  by  Rosenberg  
and  Shavell  that  introduces  a  system  of  random  adjudication  (50  percent)  
with  double  damages  (2005).   Although  our  proposal  shares  with  that  of  
is faced with a choice between a multiplier of 2 or  3, he or she will select the lower  
multiplier.  If  the  parties  agree  to  divide  the  surplus  from  bargaining  equally,  a  
multiplier  of  2  creates  an  expected  settlement  of  $95  (the  expected  value  of  the  
plaintiff  is  $80-$45=$35,  the  expected  cost  of  the  claim  for  the  defendant  is  -$80-  
75=-$155). With a multiplier of 3, the expected value of settlement falls to $90 (the  
expected  value  of  the  plaintiff  is  $80-30=$50,  the  expected  loss  of  the  claim  to  the  
defendant  is  -$80-50=-$130).  An  inverse  multiplier  of  1/3  has  a  relatively  greater  
impact  in  reducing the  defendant's  litigation  costs  and, in  the  process, reduces the  
settlement offer the plaintiff can hope to receive.  
7  Rosenberg  &  Shavell,  2005  (proposing  a  system  of  random  adjudication  with  
double damages).  
8  Both  proposals  adapt  to  the  context  of  litigation  fundamental  law  enforcement  
policy insights. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,  
76   J.  POL.  ECON.   169,   183-82   (1968)   (explaining   the   fundamental   trade-off   in  
enforcement  policy  between  the  levels  of  certainty  and  severity  of  sanctions).  See  
also James D. Miller, Using Lotteries to Expand the Range of Litigation Settlements,  
26  J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 69  (1997)  (showing that  litigants might  settle  after  agreeing  
to participate in a lottery). Both are cited in Rosenberg & Shavell, 2005, 1722, fn. 2.  
9
  We  stress  that  our  system  could  also  be  of  use  for  positive  expected  value  suits,  
especially litigation involving relatively high trial costs (see further).  
10
 Trial costs may differ substantially from case to case and from plaintiff to plaintiff  
(e.g. different  psychological  costs). Note  that  a  system  of double  damages  and  a  50  
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 Similar  to  the  proposal  outlined  in  this  article,  institutional  measures  
such  as  fee  shifting,  class  actions,  and  insurance  and  subsidies  for  legal  
expenses  and  legal  representation  address  issues  of  litigation  costs  and  
access   to  justice.   While  existing  instruments  rely  on   subsidies   by   third  
parties  (from  the  plaintiffs  to  the  attorney  in  class  action  litigation,  from  
the  losing  litigant  in  a  system  with  fee-shifting)  or  public  investments  in  
private   litigation   (subsidies   for   legal   expenses),   our   proposal   does   not  
involve any redistribution from and to and from any third parties.11  
3 Model  
 
In this Section we present a formal exposition of our proposal.  
3.1   Assumptions and Notations  
 
Throughout the analysis we will apply the following symbols:  
Pp  
 
Pd  
= the estimation by the plaintiff of the plaintiff's chance of success  
 
= the estimation by the defendant of the plaintiff's chance of success  
J = the damage award  
Cp  
 
Cd  
= the trial costs of the plaintiff  
 
= the trial costs of the defendant  
M = the multiplier chosen by the plaintiff  
We   adopt   the   following   (initial)   assumptions.   Both   parties   are   risk  
neutral,   filing   and   settling   lawsuits   is   costless   (but   there   are   costs   to  
litigate   a   claim),   parties   know   each   other's   estimation   of   the   plaintiff's  
probability  of  success  at  trial  12  (and  there  is  no  asymmetric  information  on  
other  aspects  as  well),  the  litigation  expenditures  of  the  parties  are  fixed,  
and  both  parties  pay  their  own  trial  costs.  If  the  parties  settle,  they  divide  
the  surplus  equally  (this  is  the  Nash  bargaining  solution).  Some  of  these  
assumptions will be relaxed further on in the model.  
percent  chance  of  adjudication  may  promote  some,  but  not  all  negative  expected  
value suits with merit.  
11
 A further comparison of our proposal with existing measures that address access  
to  justice  (fee  shifting,  contingency  fees,  litigation  insurance,  etc.)  is  beyond  the  
scope of the current project. Also, we do not engage in a broad cost-benefit analysis  
of  our  proposal.  Instead,  our  analysis  is  focused  on  the  impact  of  the  proposal  on  
legal claims that have negative value due to litigation costs.  
12
 More precisely, the estimations are common knowledge.  
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 Let  us  first describe how  our proposal  fits within the chronology of legal  
disputes.  Currently,  without  applying  the  proposal,  a  plaintiff  either  files  
suit  or  not.  After  a  claim  has  been  filed,  the  parties  will  either  settle  or  go  
to trial. If the parties go to trial and the plaintiff wins the case, the plaintiff  
obtains  a  damage  award.  Likewise,  in  our  proposal,  a  plaintiff  can,  again,  
elect  to  either  file  suit  or  not.  However,  under  our  proposal,  if  the  suit  is  
filed  and  the  parties  do  not  settle,  the  plaintiff  can  select  a  multiplier.  A  
lottery  system  then  determines  whether  the  plaintiff  is  allowed  to  litigate  
their claim.  13 If the case is not chosen to proceed, the legal dispute comes to  
an  end.  If  the  plaintiff  may  proceed,  the  parties  are  thus  given  another  
chance  to  settle  the  claim.  Otherwise,  the  plaintiff  may  go  to  trial.  If  the  
parties  go  to  trial  and  the  plaintiff  prevails,  the  plaintiff  obtains  a  damage  
award multiplied by the selected multiplier.  
3.2   The Selection of the Damage Multiplier by the Plaintiff  
Cp  
Without  our proposal, a plaintiff  cannot  credibly  threaten to go  to  trial  if  
>  P  p.J.  No  settlement  offer  settlement  offer  by  the  defendant  will  be  
forthcoming.   Under   our   proposal,   a   plaintiff   can   select   a   multiplier   M.  
Accordingly,  the  plaintiff  has  a  probability  of  1/M  that  their  claim  will  be  
allowed  to  go  to  court.  If  randomly  selected  for  trial,  the  expected  value  of  
the  claim  will  equal  P  p.M.J  -  C p  and  the  expected  losses  of  the  defendant  
will  equal  P  d.M.J  +  C d.     After  the  plaintiff  chooses  a  certain  M  and  is  
allowed  to  proceed,  the  parties  will  settle  if,  and  only  if,  P  d.M.J  +  C  d  ≥  
P  .pM .J   -  Cp.  This  equation  can  be  rewritten  as  follows:  C  p  +  C d  ≥  (P  p-  
P  d).M.J.   In  case  of  a  settlement,  the  likely  amount  will  consist  of  P  p.M.J  -  
Cp  + ½.(P  d.M.J + C  d - P  p.M.J + C p).14  
 
Let us examine the gains the plaintiff expects for any given multiplier M.  
If  the  parties  go  to  trial,  the  expected  value  of  the  plaintiff  who  chooses  a  
certain M  equals:  1/M.(P  p.M.J-C p)  + (1-1/M).0  =  P p.J  - C p/M. If  the  plaintiff  
chooses an M which is likely to induce a settlement, the plaintiff will expect  
to  obtain  1/M.(P  p.M.J  -  C p  +  ½.(P  d.M.J  +  C  d  -  P  p.M.J  +  C p)  +  (1-1/M).0  =  
P  .pJ   +  ½.(P  d.J  -  P  p.J  +  (C d-C p)/M).  We  need  to  distinguish  between  the  
following conditions:  
 
13
  The  random  selection  of  cases  for  trial  may  be  perceived  as  arbitrarily  reducing  
access  to  justice  to  some  plaintiffs.  However,  the  beneficial  effects  of  the  proposal  
are  assured  by  the  fact  that  many  defendants  will  settle  claims  in  light  of  the  
possibility that a multiplier will be selected by the plaintiff. Also, it is important to  
consider  that  the  merits  of  the  proposal  must  be  evaluated  against  the  current  
situation where negative  value  suits are neither filed nor settled. For  a discussion,  
see Part 4 below.  
14
 This is the Nash bargaining solution.  
8 
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 Condition 1: If P  p ≤ P  d, the parties will always settle after the plaintiff has  
chosen a certain M, no matter what M the plaintiff selects. The plaintiff will  
choose M to maximize:  
(1)  
 
What multiplier will a risk neutral plaintiff likely select?   At the limit, M  
must  be  high  enough  to…  in  order  for  the  legal  claim  to  reflect  a  positive  
expected  value.  Hence,  the  minimum  multiplier  (M min) must  satisfy  P  p.M.J  
-  C  p  ≥  0  or  Mmin  =  Cp/(P  p.J).  Whether  the  plaintiff  will  ask  for  a  M  greater  
than  Mmin  depends  on  the  relative  litigation  costs  of  both  parties.  If  the  
costs  of trial  are higher for the plaintiff than for the defendant (C p>C  d), the  
plaintiff   will   select   the   highest   multiplier   possible   (M max).15   A   higher  
multiplier  would  reduce  the  difference  between  the  expected  trial  costs  of  
both parties. Formally, S increases when M increases:  
(2)  
Conversely, if the defendant's litigation costs exceed those of the plaintiff  
(C d ≥ C  p), the plaintiff will select M min. That is because any further  increase  
of   M,   benefits   the   defendant   more   than   the   plaintiff.16  
decreases or remains the same if M increases:  
Formally,   S  
(3)  
15  Mmax  could  be  imposed by law  (see further). If  not, a risk neutral plaintiff  would  
choose an infinitely high M.  
16
 Actually, when C  p=C d, the plaintiff will be indifferent.  
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 Condition 2: If P  p > P  d, the decision to settle depends on the choice of M.  
If  the  plaintiff  chooses  an  M  >  (C  p+C  d)/(P p-P  d).J,  the  parties  will  proceed  
to  trial.  In  that  case,  the  plaintiff  needs  to  maximize  P  p.J  -  C  p/M.  The  
plaintiff will select an M that is as high as possible (M max) and will expect to  
 gain  P  p.J  -  C  p/M max.  If  the  plaintiff  selects  an  M  ≤  (C p+C  d)/(P  p-P  d).J,  the  
parties will settle. If C  p>C d, the plaintiff will select a maximum M, equaling  
(C p+C  d)/(P  p-Pd).J  17.        We  denote  this  maximum  as  M  max'       .  The  plaintiff  thus  
 
expects  to  gain  P  p.J  -  C p/M max' .       18  When  C p≤C  d,  the  plaintiff  selects  M min.  
The plaintiffs expects to gain ½.(P  d.J + C  d/M min).  19 We now must distinguish  
between two sub-conditions:  
Condition 2.A. If C p>C  d, the plaintiff balances P  p.J - C  p/Mmax  
-  C  p/M max' .        The  plaintiff  will  choose  Mmax  
when  Mmax  >  M  max' .        When  M max'  
the parties will settle.  
against P  p.J  
and  the  parties  will  go  to  trial  
>  M max,  the  plaintiff  will  select  Mmax  and  
Condition  2.B.  If   C  p  ≤   C  d,  the  plaintiff   balances  P  p.J  -  C p/Mmax  
½.(P  d.J  +  C  d/M min).  Since  Mmin  
with  
=  C  p/P  p.J,  the  plaintiff  will  ask  for  Mmin  and  
the  parties  will  settle  when  (P  p-  ½.P  d).J  ≤  C  p/Mmax  (C  d/C  p).P  p.J.  Since_  
C  d≥C  p,  this  is  always  true.  In  other  words,  when  C p  ≤  C d,  the  plaintiff  will  
select Mmin and the parties settle.  
3.3. Risk aversion and endogenous trial expenditures  
A  risk-averse  plaintiff  will  be  particularly  sensitive  to  the  chance  of  not  
being  selected  for  trial.  The  sensitivity  to  this  probability  will  obviously  
induce the  selection  of a  lower M.  A  risk-averse plaintiff  is thus unlikely  to  
select M max. As the plaintiff's risk aversion increases, the optimal multiplier  
for  a  risk-averse  plaintiff  will  be  closer  to  the  minimum  multiplier  M min.  
More formally, the plaintiff will increase M as long as the marginal benefits  
17
 Since we consider the case M ≤ (C  p+C d)(P  p-P  d).J.  
18
  When  the  plaintiff  chooses  M max'       ,  the  expected  value  of  the  plaintiff  equals  the  
expected loss of the defendant, since for any M  ≤ M max'        the parties settle and for any  
M > M max'  
at M max' .  
the parties litigate. Consequently, the settlement surplus is equal to zero  
19
 When the plaintiff chooses M min, his expected value of trial is zero (by definition of  
M min).  
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 from  an  increase  (larger  settlement  amount  or  larger  expected  value  of  
trial) outweigh the marginal costs of risk.  
A multiplier increases the stakes of litigation. As such, it can be expected  
that  the  expenditures  on  cases  selected  for  trial  will  increase  accordingly.  
Plaintiffs  have  a  greater  incentive  to  win  and  will  spend  more  time  and  
resources to obtain (multiplied) damages. Likewise, defendants will have an  
increased  incentive  not  to  lose  the  case.  If  the  plaintiff  increases  his  or  her  
trial  expenditures  in  proportion  to  the  increased  stakes  (from  C  p  to  M.C  p),  
the   lawsuit   retains   its   negative   expected   value.   After   selecting   M   and  
receiving  permission  to   proceed,  the  expected  value  of   the  plaintiff  will  
remain negative:22  
20  21  
Pp.M.J - M.C  p = M. (P .J - C ) < 0  
p               p  
(4) 
Although  expenditures  are  likely  to  rise,  this  increase  will  generally  be  
lower  than  the  increase  of  the  stakes.  This  follows  from  the  assumption  
that  parties  will  make  the  most  worthwhile  legal  investments.  In  other  
words,  the  marginal  return  of  the  investment  decreases  as  a  party  makes  
additional    investments.    Empirical    research    has    confirmed    that    the  
expenditures of the parties do not rise as rapidly as the amount awarded in  
trial or settlement.23  
4 Potential Objections  
 
(1)   The   proposal   is   unfair   to   a   plaintiff.   One   may   well   argue   that   the  
proposed system is unfair because not all plaintiffs are treated equally as some  
claims  are  admitted  to  trial  and  others  are  not.  A  few  responses  are  in  order.  
First,  plaintiffs  with  identical  trial  costs  are  treated  equally  if  they  select  the  
same  multiplier.  All  plaintiffs  have  the  same  probability  of  selection  for  trial.  
Some litigants will be lucky, others will not be so fortunate.   Second, most cases  
will  settle  before  the  plaintiff  has  filed  suit  and has  selected  a  multiplier.  Risk  
aversion  among  parties  will  induce many  settlements  prior to the official filing  
stage.  Hence,  random  selection  occurs  only  with  regard  to  plaintiffs  that  have  
20
  Note  that  risk  aversion  may  increase  the  settlement  frequency  for  two  reasons.  
First,  the  costs  of  risk  may  widen  the  settlement  range.  Second,  risk  aversion  
induces   lower   multipliers   and   thus   decreases   the   amounts   at   stake.   Smaller  
amounts at stake reduce the chance that relative optimism will cause litigation.  
21
 For the influence of risk aversion on the defendant, see further.  
22
 For the sake of simplicity, we hold P  p constant.  
23
 See Kakalik, J.S. et al, 1984.  
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 not settled prior to the filing stage. Third, even if some plaintiffs are left empty-  
handed  under  the  proposed  system,  plaintiffs  with  negative  expected  value  
suits  often  receive  nothing  under  the  current  system.  From  this  viewpoint,  the  
proposed system enhances fairness.  
 
Finally,    the    legal    system    generally    treats    individuals    with    similar  
characteristics  differently  for  the  purpose  of  cost  savings  and  efficiency.  For  
example,  when  ten  individuals  consistently  speed  on  the  highway  during  the  
course of one year, it is probable that  some of the offenders will receive several  
speeding tickets while others may not receive any tickets at all. The scarcity of  
resources for monitoring traffic law violations, which also applies to the broader  
range    of    law    enforcement    activities,    necessitates    a    certain    element    of  
randomness (Rosenberg & Shavell, 2005).  
(2)    The    proposal    is    unfair    to    a    defendant.    The    random    element    of  
adjudication  also  impacts  defendants.  Defendants  will  face  trial  only  if  the  
claim  of  the  plaintiff  is  selected  for  trial.  As  a  result,  some  defendants  will  not  
have  to  compensate  victims  and others  will  be  forced to  pay  disproportionately  
high damages in comparison to the harm they caused. This may be regarded as  
unfair.  However,  the  same  remarks  made  above  apply  with  equal  force  here.  
Most  prominently, parties  may settle  prior  to the  case  being  filed.  Moreover,  it  
is important to recognize that the proposed system would enhance the deterrent  
effect  of  the  tort  system  by  creating  a  credible  threat  of  litigation  in  disputes  
where a plaintiff has a strong legal claim.  
(3)  The proposal  adversely  affects risk-averse  parties.  Because the  stakes  are  
increased, our proposal imposes additional risks on individuals involved in legal  
disputes.   To   the   extent   that   parties   are   risk   averse,   these   risks   must   be  
considered a cost of the system. The plaintiff faces the risk that his case will be  
eliminated  at  the  filing  stage.  However,  the  risk  of  not  being  selected  is  an  
improvement   over   the   certainty   of   not   receiving   compensation,   as   is   quite  
common  in  the  current  approach  of  negative  value  suits. 24  For  the  defendant,  
the  system  imposes  a  potential  cost  that  is  the  multiple  of  the  actual  harm  
inflicted  on  the  victim.  However,  this  risk  can  be  avoided  through  settlement.  
Consider  also  that  with  higher  degrees  of  risk  aversion  among  parties,  it  is  
more likely that claims will settle prior to filing.25  
24  Of  course,  even  under  the  current  situation  there  are  situations  in  which  a  
plaintiff  with  a  NEV  suit  obtains  a  settlement  amount  (e.g.  when  the  plaintiff  has  
insurance for legal expenses).  
25
 The random element of litigation creates a risk for the plaintiff that the case will  
be terminated without relief; for the defendant the multiplier imposes an additional  
risk of damages being increased. See Rosenberg & Shavell, 2005, 1727-28.  
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 (4) The proposal will induce frivolous lawsuits and weak cases. As a potential  
drawback,  our  proposed  system  may  attract  frivolous  lawsuits.  Plaintiffs  with  
very  weak  cases,  who  would  otherwise  not  undertake  any  action,  might  be  
compelled to select a high multiplier in the hope that their case might randomly  
be  selected  for  trial.  In  the  advent  of  this  possibility,  defendants  who  are  very  
risk  averse  might  be  inclined  to  make  settlement  offers.  Yet,  the  attraction  of  
frivolous suits is not necessarily an insurmountable problem. To a large extent,  
abuse of the system  can be avoided by allowing judges to  punish  plaintiffs who  
bring  frivolous  lawsuits  with  increased  sanctions.  Aside  from  frivolous  suits,  
our proposal also makes it easier to file rather weak - but not frivolous - cases.  
In  the  following  section  we  suggest  some  modifications  that  would  reduce  the  
incidence of weak cases.  
(5)   The  proposal  will   be  used  for  lawsuits  with   positive  expected   values.  
Another  point  worth considering  is that the  system might  be used by plaintiffs  
for whom the system is not intended: plaintiffs with claims that have a positive  
expected  value.  Obviously  also  these  plaintiffs  may  benefit  from  the  reduction  
in  expected trial  costs  created  by  our  proposal. 26  Although  some  plaintiffs  with  
PEV suits may attempt to use the multiplier, there is reason to believe that this  
will  only  occur  in  a  limited  set  of  cases.  Interestingly,  plaintiffs  with  high  trial  
costs are especially likely to benefit from our proposal. Only for these plaintiffs  
may the reduction in expected trial costs outweigh the risk of not being selected  
for  trial.  Suppose  a  plaintiff  with  trial  costs  of  $800  selects  a  multiplier  of  2.  
The  expected  trial  costs  decrease  from  $800  to  $400.  Plaintiffs  with  low  trial  
costs do not have as much to gain from choosing a multiplier. Suppose that the  
trial  costs  of  the  plaintiff  are  $200.  By  selecting  a  multiplier  of  2,  the  plaintiff  
gains  only  $100.  Assume  further  that  litigants  are  risk  averse.  The  increased  
26  As   an   example,   consider   the   following   situation:   A   plaintiff   has   a   highly  
meritorious claim with a probability of trial victory of 90%. The amount at stake is  
$1,000. The plaintiff's trial costs are $800. The plaintiff has a claim with a positive  
expected  value  but  the  trial  costs  are  close  to  the  expected  value  of  the  judgment  
($900). Suppose that the defendant's trial costs are only $200. The plaintiff wants a  
minimum  settlement  amount  of  $100  ($900-$800),  while  the  maximum  settlement  
amount acceptable to the defendant is $1,100 ($900+$200). If the parties divide the  
settlement  surplus  equally,  they  will  settle  for  an  amount  of  $600.  Although  the  
plaintiff  does  not  need  a  multiplier  to  obtain  a  positive  settlement  offer,  he  or  she  
will  select  this  option,  especially  if  the  plaintiff  is  not  too  risk  averse.  Suppose  for  
simplicity  purposes  that  a  risk   neutral  plaintiff  selects  a  multiplier  of   2.  The  
expected  value  becomes  $500  (1/2x(0.9x2,000-800)).  Now  the  expected  losses  of  the  
defendant  are  $1000  (1/2x(0.9x2,000+200)).  The  parties will  settle  for  $750  instead  
of $600.  
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 risk of not being allowed to go to court is worth taking mostly then by plaintiffs  
with high trial costs.27  
(6)  The  proposal  will  increase  trial  expenditures.  As  the  stakes  increase,  
expenditures  will  rise  for  those  cases  that  are  selected  for  trial.  Plaintiffs  will  
now  have  a  greater  incentive  to  win  and  will  therefore  spend  more  time  and  
resources  to  obtain  (multiplied)  damages.  Likewise,  defendants  will  have  an  
increased incentive not to lose. However, it should be recognized that, first, due  
to   risk   aversion,   plaintiffs   will   often   select   a   relatively   small   multiplier.28  
Second,  cases  with  a  high  multiplier  have  a  low  chance  of  being  selected  for  
trial. Consequently, trial expenditures will seldom be incurred in these cases.  
(7)   The   proposal   will   increase   the   amount   of   litigation.   Obviously,   the  
proposal  will  increase  the  amount  of  litigation. 29  However,  it  is  questionable  
whether   a   system   of   selected   multipliers   will   substantially   increase   the  
workload  of  the  judiciary.  First  of  all,  a  dispute  will  only  be  allowed  to  go  to  
court with a probability of 1/M. When faced with high  trial costs relative to the  
potential  damage  award,  a  plaintiff  will  need to  select  a  large  multiplier.  Such  
disputes  will  rarely  make  it  to  trial.  Second,  the  parties  will  often  settle  the  
dispute  prior  to  the  selection  of  a  multiplier  by  the  plaintiff;  especially  if  the  
parties are risk averse. This result occurs because (a) the potential risk widens  
the   settlement   range;   and   (b)   risk   averse   plaintiffs   will   generally   select   a  
modest  multiplier.  Lower  multipliers  reduce  the  amount  at  stake,  inducing  
additional settlements.30  
27
 Notice the difference with the system proposed by Rosenberg and Shavell (2005).  
Our  proposal  is  of  particular  use  to  plaintiffs  with  high  trial  costs.  Such  plaintiffs  
are  more  likely  to  select  a  multiplier  and,  consequently,  many  of  these  cases  will  
never make it to court. By contrast, in Rosenberg and Shavell's proposal, cases with  
low and high trial costs are treated the same: all cases have a 50 percent chance of  
being eliminated.  
28
 And the lower the multiplier, the greater the settlement frequency.  
29
  However, note that,  if the  system would also  be  used for  PEV suits, a multiplier  
can also reduce the amount of litigation. See Rosenberg & Shavell, 2005.  
30
  The  parties  only  go  to  trial  when  the  multiplier  is  larger  than  (C p+C d)/(P  p-P  d).J.  
The  trial  costs  (C p+C  d)  are  by  definition  relatively  larger  because  the  plaintiff's  
claim has negative expected value.  
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5 
Possible Modifications  
In this section we suggest a few modifications of our proposal. These variations  
address some of the remaining objections to our proposal.  
5.1   Limiting the Multiplier  
We  have  discussed  how  risk  neutral  plaintiffs  will  often  select  the  maximum  
multiplier  available.  In  reality,  however,  plaintiffs  are  risk  averse  usually  and  
may  often  select  a  multiplier  that  is  much  lower.  Nonetheless,  some  plaintiffs  
with weak cases may select large multipliers in order to exploit risk aversion on  
the  part  of  defendants.  This  could  largely  be  prevented  by  imposing  a  cap  or  
ceiling   on   the   size   of   the   multiplier   a   plaintiff   can   choose.   For   example,  
plaintiffs could be obliged to select a multiplier in a range between 1 and 3. 31 By  
limiting   the   multiplier,   potential   abuses   of   the   system   are   curbed,   while  
reducing  potential  trial  expenditures  for  cases  that  do  end  up  going  to  trial.  
However,  it  should be  noted that a  restriction  on  the  size  of  the  multiplier  will  
prevent some victims from creating a credible threat of suit.32  
5.2   Tying the Multiplier to the Merits of the Case  
We have seen that the system may attract frivolous suits and that this problem  
could partially be solved by either increasing the sanctions for frivolous suits or  
by  capping  the  multiplier  to  a  certain  maximum.  However,  these  measures  do  
not prevent  the  system  from attracting weak -  though  not frivolous -  claims.33  
Weak cases could be deterred somewhat by tying the multiplier to the merits of  
the  case.  If  the  court  finds  the  case  to  be  relatively  weak  from  an  ex-ante  
perspective  but  strong  enough  for  a  plaintiff  victory,  the  court  could  lower  the  
multiplier that the plaintiff selected.34  
31
  Additionally,  the  system  could  be  restricted  to  claims  up  to  a  certain  value,  e.g.  
$5000.  Alternatively,  the  maximum  multiplier  could  be  linked  to  the  amount  at  
stake: the higher the amount at stake, the lower the maximum multiplier.  
32
 Some victims may have such substantial trial costs that the maximum multiplier  
allowed by law is smaller than the minimum multiplier they need to make their suit  
have positive expected value.  
33
  Note  that  a maximum multiplier  can prevent  many, but not  all weak cases from  
being filed.  
34
 An analogy exists with fee shifting systems that are conditioned on the margin of  
victory: in many legal systems with fee  shifting, indemnification awards tend to be  
more generous in cases where the loser's legal or factual position appears weak.  
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 5.3  
Suits  
Restricting  the  Proposal  to  Negative  Expected  Value  
If  for  some  reason  we  wanted  the  system  to  be  restricted  to  lawsuits  with  
negative expected value, this could be achieved, in theory, in two ways:  
 
1.  Ex  ante:  If  the  plaintiff  selects  a  multiplier,  the  court  could  immediately  
estimate  whether  the  claim  could  be  filed  without  the  system  (that  is,  verify  
whether  the  expected  costs  are  larger  than  the  expected benefits  of  the  case  at  
trial).  If   the  answer   is   in   the  affirmative,  the  court   could  then   refuse  the  
plaintiff's  multiplier.  Needless  to  say,  courts  (or  court  officials)  will  sometimes  
make  errors  when  performing  this  task.  When  courts  are  assigned  such  tasks,  
it is inevitable that a certain number of cases with positive expected values will  
move  through  the  system,  while  some  negative  expected  value  cases  will  be  
denied the use of a multiplier.  
 
2.  Ex  post:  Perhaps  more  realistically,  in  the  court's  final  decision,  it  could  
refuse to apply the damage multiplier if it feels as though the claim would have  
been filed in any event, even without the system. This approach creates greater  
risks  for  the  plaintiff,  but  it  reduces  transaction  costs  relative  to  the  ex  ante  
approach.  
6 Conclusion  
In  this  paper  we  propose  a  new  system  that  may  stimulate  valuable  claims.  
Our  proposal  introduces  a  flexible  damage  multiplier  which  inversely  affects  
the   probability   of   adjudication.   A   plaintiff   is   allowed   to   select   a   damage  
multiplier while, at the same time, their access to the courts is restricted with a  
probability  equal  to  the  inverse  of  the  damage  multiplier  he  or  she  selected.  
While  the  expected  benefits  of  litigation  remain  the  same  under  this  system;  
the expected costs drop. This increases the overall expected value of lawsuits.  
 
Our proposal has some disadvantages that can be eliminated to some extent.  
Most  notably,  the  system  may  attract frivolous  lawsuits  and  may  also  advance  
lawsuits involving weak claims. These disadvantages can be largely avoided by  
increasing   the   sanctions   for   frivolous   suits,   by   introducing   a   maximum  
multiplier, and by tying the multiplier to the merits of the case.  
 
Finally,   an   interesting   feature   of   this   system   is   that   it   is   unlikely   to  
substantially  increase  the  workload  of  the  civil  justice  system.  Our  proposal  
will  induce  many  more  settlements  than  it  will  generate  additional  litigation.  
The system should function to increase deterrence at relatively low cost. We do  
not  propose  a  wholesale  adaptation  of  this  system.  To  be  sure,  we  recommend  
implementing this system on a minor scale first. Only after a thorough analysis  
of the results would a further expansion would be appropriate.  
16 
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